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1. The entry of UNTAG into Namibia and the inauguration of a diarchy between 
Secretary General's Special Representative and Botha's Special 
Representative (the AG) creates a paradox for the Office of the 
Commissioner:
a. it can for the first time send personnel to Namibia (not perhaps in 
UNTAG but to do studies and liaise with other UN agencies);
b. but it is presumably bound by the 'impartiality' doctrine (however, 
if that is read as not working with AG or any parties and so going to 
Churches and Trade Unions it does not really prejudice Comnam's work 
as SWAPO, SWANU, Damara Chiefs, NCPD, etc., presumably will be tied 
up with election work anyhow);
c. and it is clear that the Council for Namibia will not become a 
government as the diarchy will be followed directly by independence.
2. Thus I would submit Comnam now enters into a set of opportunities for 
furthering the Nationhood Programme through specific field research and 
pre-programming designed for use after independence. It should - as 
before but more urgently - try to coordinate other UN bodies and ngo's 
with this work and its post independence implementation. (For example, 
both UNICEF and ILO have clear plans with the former already discussing 
them with "technically competent Namibians with wide expertise and 
internal contacts" in Luanda whom it anticipates will form the 
independence government. An 'impartial' way of saying something shorter, 
i.e. it has been dealing with SWAPO and does not see itself as seeing 
different people. If all UN agencies do this overlap will ensue. If 
some - e.g. IFAD - do not then gaps will ensue. Comnam can take the lead 
in coordination. My impression is that were this done quietly the 
Special Representative would welcome it.)
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3. Seven specific information collection/pre-programming cases are set out. 
So far as I know no other body is actively doing anything on the ground 
albeit I note where I believe interest (and thus people and/or money or 
’sub-contracted' study for Comnam) exists. While I cannot speak for them 
I would also note that my experienced Namibian friends believe these to 
be issues of some importance where they cannot act until independence but 
would then need data/pre-planning base to act fast. I have not listed 
Central Bank because I believe Comnam - Ben Amathila and Sweden already 
have this in hand. If not it is one of priority list. As any 
independent government will need such a study no 'impartiality' problem.
4. Swakopmund Reactivation
South Africa's remaining in Walvis Bay when Namibia is independent will 
be illegal. Even if it could remain, by relevant international
convention all port-transport-commercial-fishing assets created to serve 
Namibia would pass free of liability to government of Namibia. But RSA 
is no respecter of international law and it is prudent to assume it will 
remain squatting on Walvis Bay and all of its facilities which it will 
seek to use to dominate independent Namibia.
Therefore, pre-engineering and rough costing studies for an alternative 
port are both vital and urgent. In practice only one option is viable - 
reactivation of Swakopmund;
a. Luderitz is too far South, has inadequate rail line and a shallow,
narrow channel which is in hard rock so not readily improved;
b. Mocamedes (Angola) is too far North and rail/road links to Northern 
Namibia would require major construction/rehabilitation;
c. Beira and Dar es Salaam (via road to Katima Mulilo and on to rail 
line at Livingstone in Zambia) are simply too far, too slow, too
expensive;
/
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d. Air is too expensive especially for petroleum (250,000 tonne), coal 
(100,000 tonne) grain (100,000 tonne).
Swakopmund should be reactiveateable in six months for $20,000,000 to
$40,000,000:
a. it is on main rail line (Windhoek-Swakopmund-on to WB) so only added 
sidings for loading, unloading would be needed;
b. a laid up oil tanker (say 50,000 to 75,000 tonne or 2 times 30,000 if 
cheaper) could be grounded as an oil storage facility with a pipe 
line (fixed or hose) to a buoy in deeper water for offloading from 
tankers;
c. floating cranes and lighters could handle 500,000-600,000 tonnes dry 
cargo quite readily (as they did in Dar es Salaam after UDI before 
new berths were complete). Coal by lighter is not ideal but with 
grab floating crane or grabs on carrier it is feasible;
d. the harbour is largely protected by the spit coming up from Walvis 
Bay and by headlands (NB it is not at mouth of Swakop which is about 
15 kilometres south of it on channel to WB). Conceivably 2 to 4 
derelict ships filled with gravel could be sunk as breakwaters but 
this may not be necessary;
e. In 1902-04 Walvis Bay was deep enough to take 3 and 4 funnel 
transatlantic liners bringing in troops. Newsreels showing one on 
each side of the jetty are extant. This suggests simple sand 
dredging could rapidly restore depth for at least 12-15,000 tonners 
in harbour proper and perhaps up to 30,000 tonnes half a mile out 
(for coal, oil);
f. In the medium term Walvis Bay will become non-economic anyhow. It is 
at end of a long, narrow, shallow channel and has a constricted 
basin. The Trans-Kalahari bulk terminal needs to be (per engineering 
study) at mouth of Swakop and at that time at least an oil and a 
container terminal should go there too.
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The immediate need is a technical study of:
a. engineering requirements;
b. probable time required;
c. probable cost;
d. key personnel needed - technical assistance plus training.
The obvious source of such a study (or of finance and a firm to do it) is 
the Netherlands. There is support for Namibia; detestation of idea RSA 
would choke it; a desire to get contracts and trade combined with port 
expertise (vide interest in Beira). A Dutch study could well lead to a 
Dutch grant/soft loan at independence and a competent Dutch firm to do 
the job.
The importance of this cannot be overstressed. Without a deep water port 
it controls, independent Namibia can and will be squeezed by RSA. With 
one RSA may abandon WB as an economic millstone (albeit it may still hang 
on to it as a destabilisation point even though it is a useless death
trap as a naval base).
5. Heavy maintenance capacity (railway rolling stock and heavy 
lorries/buses) needs:
a. an inventory of what exists;
b. an estimate of how much is done now in RSA (most railway seems to be
at Upington in Cape or WB where RSA may remain illegally);
c. a rough costed study of what equipment and buildings are needed to
provide interim self-sufficiency in repairs and a donor pre-disposed 
to act fast were it to receive a request at independence.
Unless transport equipment can be repaired in Namibia transport will 
either grind to a halt or operate ’courtesy' of RSA.
This issue was discussed at Stockholm transport conference in early 
December. I believe Nordic sources (perhaps via Nordic Council?) are 
interested. There is consultancy, design, equipment and ongoing
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technical assistance capacity in those states as well as a practical 
commitment to independent Namibia.
5A. Related lorry-bus-rolling stock and traction power study:
a. inventory of numbers of light lorries, small buses, heavy lorries,
large buses, petroleum road tankers, locomotives, bogies (by main 
type, e.g. ore/coal, container, petroleum, general cargo, passenger 
coaches);
b. monitoring outflow to RSA (it will happen and cannot really be halted 
before independence as departures will be legitimate, the problem is 
non-return);
c. rough estimates by October of probable early replacement needs and
tentative lineup (earlier) of donor ready to move at once on post
independence request.
Again Nordic area may be best place to look. Vehicles are useable (may 
not be optimal) and railway equipment good (if high cost) - the plus 
points are likely speed of response and willingness to provide on grant 
or soft loan terms.
If Federal Germany is willing to organise to move equally fast on 
comparable terms it is probably a better source for lorries and buses.
6. Windhoek water supply poses grave technical and personnel problems. It 
is highly sophisticated in reclaiming, purifying, recycling used water. 
If this part of system (supposedly 30—35% of total supply) breaks down 
either there will be a very serious water shortage or a very real risk of 
a massive cholera epidemic.
The need seems to be:
a. details on main sources and supply systems including but not only 
recycling element;
b. identification of chemical and frequently used spares needs;
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c. enumeration of key personnel (and probable risk of their early 
departure) to keep system running properly.
The best source of people to do this may be Zimbabwe - specifically 
Harare water department which operates (very efficiently) what is said to 
be the most comparable metropolitan system. Perhaps CFTC at Commonwealth 
Secretariat could finance Zimbabwe team if Comnam hasn't the funds.
7. Ruacana electricity complex rehabilitation pre-engineering and costing 
study and donor pre-positioning is crucial:
a. key personnel studies for Ruacana Falls generation, transmission, 
main distribution systems to identify tentative technical assistance 
backup needed to avoid breakdown if many present personnel leave 
suddenly;
b. rehabilitation (if any) and ongoing supplies, spares needs of
Ruacana Falls generation;
c. rehabilitation needs of Ruacana-Windhoek transmission line (a regular
sabotage target albeit it may well be pylons can be replaced and 
lines restrung before November);
d. rehabilitation needs of Caleuque sluice (water level control) to be
done with cooperation of Angola in whose territory it is.
Finland and Canada are two countries expert in these areas whose attitude 
to Namibia suggests they might respond positively and promptly to
approaches.
8. Internal refugees - deslocados - probably number over 250,000. Action is 
needed over April-November as well as after independence. The main 
concentration - up to 200,000 - appears to be in the 
Ondangwa-Oshakati-Ongwadiva triangle ('normal' population perhaps 
50-75,000) which implies depopulation or near depopulation of much of 
rural area in Ovambo magisterial district - so-called Ovamboland).
What is needed - apart from immediate food, shelter, medicines and 
vaccines which ngo's (including church-related ones known to Namibian 
Churches), WHP, UNICEF, EEC should be asked to provide with some Comnam 
coordination if they desire it - are data:
a. how many deslocados? Where?
b. from where? Probability of short term return to homes? If so what 
rehabilitation needs (transport, building materials, seeds, tools, 
core livestock units, food)?
c. sanitation, water, shelter, food, medical service needs of deslocados 
in areas of refuge, especially 0-0-0 triangle.
Presumably UNHCR can and will coordinate the return of the 100,000 odd 
Namibians who are refugees in neighbouring states. Nobody, however,
seems to have a clear remit or clear data about the larger numbers of
human beings (many in much worse conditions) who are deslocados in 
Namibia.
Note the AG may try to foist the 'Angolan refugees' (i.e. UNITA camp 
followers or reserve forces) on Comnam. There is an 'impartial', 
technical answer - Comnam's remit is for Namibians and whatever else 
Savimbi's outfit may be they are not Namibians.
It is not quite clear who might finance and staff this exercise. There
is ngo and academic expertise (e.g. at Oxford and elsewhere in UK) and 
presumably some general government humanitarian concern. As this is 
eminently non-political perhaps UK and Federal Germany would be willing 
to provide resources? Or even USA?
9. Crop production outturns and especially potential in Namibia are near 
terra incognita not because there are no data but because it is scattered 
inside Namibia. It needs to be retrieved over April-November or it may 
be irretrievably lost.
The key data areas are:
a. actual outputs, techniques, yields per hectare of 'traditional'
Northern cultivation; Okavango Valley African irrigated farms; crops 
on 'white' ranches (and especially Tsumeb and Otavi Highland mixed
farms); irrigation schemes (especially the Hardap scheme near
Mariental and perhaps smaller Southwest artesian production plus
Consolidated Diamond Mines pump irrigated farms on the Orange River);
b. experimental station and research results in Namibia (believed to be 
substantial);
c. relevant Botswana/Zimbabwe semi-arid area practice and research data
(available from SACCAR in Gaborone and/or SADCC Agricultural Sector
Coordinating Unit in Harare);
d. present key personnel in research/extension and likelihood of staying
(supposedly most are German settlers and minded to stay but this
needs to be checked);
e. draft programme of research, extension, input supply, marketing and 
crop pricing to further enhanced crop production especially by small 
black farming households but also on the larger ranching units 
(whoever operates them after independence).
The logical agencies to do this would appear to be IFAD and/or ICRISAT 
and/or IDCD (Canada). ICRISAT tends to have a very long lead time (and 
FAO's past Namibia work has not been very applied or thorough) so IFAD 
and ICDC would appear the most promising options.
English is the chosen national language of virtually all Namibian parties
(not just the Liberation Movement). Therefore it is urgent to devise 
(and test) a programme for rapid, mass English teaching.
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Work has been done by the National Council of Churches of Namibia and by
UNIN (Distance Education) and research by the Commonwealth Secretariat.
What is needed now is:
a. to collect all work and experience to date;
b. to have a NCC-UNIN-CS workshop to agree on ways and means including
test programmes (training trainers, distance education, urban and 
rural language groups);
c. to begin test projects;
d. to carry out a design study including costs, personnel, training 
material requirements for full scale programme (subject to revision 
on basis of results of "c").
Possibly the Commonwealth Secretariat could provide some funds and
personnel. As Sweden is dominant and Federal Germany second source of
adult education support they could also be approached.
11. All of these projects are:
a. of crucial importance;
b. needing action before independence at least at study and 
pre-positioning donors to allow rapid construction after 
independence;
c. quite ’’non-political" in the sense that any government of independent 
Namibia would want the data so that ’impartiality' is not 'violated' 
even though most or all do appear in UNIN's 1985 overall survey 
volume.
12. Comnam should encourage UN specialised agencies:
a. to go in to do studies within their remits over April-November;
b. to liaise with Comnam to avoid overlapping and to point out gaps 
needing to be filled.
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It is probably better placed to do this than the Special Representative 
who will have his hands (and feet!) full with peace-keeping, election 
nurturing and AG containing!
However, Special Representative has indicated (in conversation with 
UNICEF Deputy Managing Director) he would be glad to create a small data 
collection unit to seek out and 'bank1 official data. This would obviate 
multiple trips to same source. The unit would take advice (and 
presumably special requests) from Comnam, UN agencies and ngo's. This
appears to be worth following up.
13. In my opinion personnel used by Comnam in Namibia before independence 
should be either technically qualified present Comnam staff or low 
profile (i.e. not publicly identified with Namibian struggle) to avoid AG 
challenges to Special Representative. This is less true for specialised 
agency or governmental agency teams (e.g. ILO proposes to use Neville 
Rubin and myself to head up a team - tentatively in May). If Norway 
would agree personnel from Christian Michelson Institute (notably John 
Scott) might be useful. (Scott is, of course, clearly associated with 
Namibian liberation but work in corridors of EEC and CMI studies means he 
is not high profile in contrast to - say - myself).
14. Whether Comnam has a role after Independence needs thinking through and
discussion with "experienced, relevant Namibians likely to form
independence government" now. It could be argued - no, it's a UNDP role.
Maybe, but special UN representatives/offices are not unknown (e.g. 
Ethiopia 1985) and Comnam may by November have enough of a lead in 
experience - especially in data collection and coordination - as to 
justify 18 to 30 month existence centred in Windhoek. That is really for 
Namibians to decide but question could usefully be put now to allow 
forward thinking by them and - depending on tentative response - forward 
planning (and budget mobilisation) by Comnam.
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